Eronarn on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Surely a little extra iron in her diet won’t make her any less healthy – how shameful for someone to butt in on a meal preparation like that!
bv728 on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Mr. Kong is one of the first men in that Kingdom to ask himself: Are we responsible for the miracles we cannot work?
Given what we know about promises in Hitherby, the unfortunate answer to that seems to be yes, for now.
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
but not everyone can be a world-turning sage king.
Sparrowhawk on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
An interesting dilemma. I also find it interesting that this entry (and the last one) really does have the feel of a Confucian fable, yet remains unmistakably Borgstromian. That’s the sign of a good writer, IMO.
I wonder if this series has a bigger overall point besides showing how the events of 539 BC affected people living at the time, and being scenes from the childhood of Confucius.
mackatlaw on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Yes. Oh yes. We’re also responsible for the harm we do not do, the pain we do not inflict, and the suffering we do not endure. If it works one way, it works another — why shouldn’t we be responsible for everything?
I suppose because that way lies madness….(read: none-functionality).
For everything we do, there is something else that we did not do instead.
Mack
mineownaardvarks on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Mack, I think there’s a difference between the miracles we do not work and the miracles we cannot work.
For example, an omnipotent god is automatically responsible for all the suffering in the universe, because he could prevent it.
Conversely, I don’t consider myself a better person because I don’t blow up the world with my mind, because I couldn’t even if I wanted to.
And certainly, by your logic and that of many others, I could be held responsible for the starvation of as many children as my income could otherwise feed.
But am I responsible for the fact that my fiance is dying, because my blood is not miracle blood and cannot heal him?
I think the strangeness this story touches on is that I feel more guilt and responsibility over the latter than the former.
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
For example, an omnipotent god is automatically responsible for all the suffering in the universe, because he could prevent it.
Conversely, I don’t consider myself a better person because I don’t blow up the world with my mind, because I couldn’t even if I wanted to.
Maybe you should. I mean, an olympic runner who lost his leg *does* consider himself a better person if he pushes himself to the ultimate hardship and competes with a prostthetic and wins the gold, a triumph of the human spirit.
Is it really commendable to not try, knowing you’d fail? Or is it better to try until it destroys you, even though you never had a chance, swearing with every breath that you would find a way to succeed?
I think, since the latter is commendable, but the former isn’t, the former is in fact condemnable. You’re willing to accept personal satisfaction knowing that you’re incapable of doing something worthwhile in the face of incredible odds. What human couldn’t see those odds, and not feel compelled to sacrifice his life in the hopes that someday in the future, it would be possible once again?
mineownaardvarks on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Here’s what I think of that:
If what you do accomplishes something, it’s worthwhile depending on the value of what it accomplishes.
That something it accomplishes could be anything. Say Person A sees that Person B is about to be crushed by a falling anvil. A is much too far away to reach B in time to get B out of the way, and B is deaf so A can’t yell look out. A charges desperately towards B anyway, but doesn’t reach B in time and B dies.
A charging towards B might have accomplished something anyway. It made B feel better in the last moments of his life that someone tried to save him. Or it might merely have made A feel like a virtuous person. Or taught her something about herself. Or gotten her in practice so that next time her reflexes will be quicker and maybe she really will get there in time. All those are accomplishments.
If what you do accomplishes nothing, it’s not worthwhile.
So if this is your proposition:
I) It is worth while to try to do a worthy thing even if you know you cannot do it.
I concur, as long as it may accomplish something else of value.
However, if this is your proposition:
II) It is worth while to try to do a worthy thing even if you know it will accomplish nothing.
I disagree.
So to bring it back to the question: are we responsible for the miracles we cannot work? No. Do we have a responsibility to try to work the miracles we cannot work? Maybe, if the trying accomplishes something besides “not the miracle.”
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
it’s a subtle distinction, but I suppose I am going with (I).
(II) implies that virtuous action is not innately good, and that not acting in a virtuous way (or acting without regard for virtue) is not the same as acting in a anti-virtuous way. Which I don’t agree with.
mineownaardvarks on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Well, I don’t claim that the condition in II is actually possible given the nature of ethics. I tend towards the Aristotelian, “virtuous person” view of ethics, which means I think that acting virtuously is inherently good in the same way that working out inherently makes someone stronger.
I think I just wanted to make things clearer in my own mind, because I really disagree with II, but was pretty sure that wasn’t what you were implying. Sorry if I implied I thought you were. :P
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
no its ok. It’s the way i type, not the way you read :twisted:
Joejay on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
How can an action be virtuous, save by its effects? I think the analogy to weight-lifting is flawed; the purpose of lifting weights is to convince the body that it must strengthen itself, and I don’t believe that making ineffectual but nominally “virtuous” actions is going to fool the conscience into spurring you to do good when there actually is some good which can be done.
mineownaardvarks on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
Ack! It’s a utilitarian! *seizes pitchfork*
Seriously, I’m not sure I quite understand your line of thought. Do you argue that it’s impossible that a person A could perform an action which she fully believe to be good, and which therefore is a “good action” when performed by her and as far as her conscience and objective moral standing are concerned, which could yet have an unforeseeable bad effect?
Or do you rather argue that if A knows the attempt to save B will not actually save B, A isn’t actually performing a virtuous act in rushing towards B because she knows perfectly well her action will not save B and therefore all her action really consists of is a sprint, which is not all that virtuous?
I admit I have some sympathy with the latter view.
Joejay on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
The latter. If one actually cannot foresee the ill effects of one’s actions, then one is not responsible for said ill effects. On the other hand, failure to foresee predictable results doesn’t make an act virtuous; if I drop a flowerpot out of my window, just because I didn’t see the baby stroller under it doesn’t absolve me of responsibility for the infanticide.
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
i’d say it would if you had a sufficently virtuous motivation for dropping the flowerpot to begin with. a bumbling fool may try and fail to be virtuous: but so may a learned scholar fail to find the true path of virtue and be waylaid by a number of myriad events. It isn’t easy to do the right thing, and it isn’t easy to know what that right thing is. Not looking before dropping the flowerpot out the window is not a virtuous action – so I agree with you on the example, but not the reasoning.
Metal Fatigue on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
(II) implies that virtuous action is not innately good, and that not acting in a virtuous way (or acting without regard for virtue) is not the same as acting in a anti-virtuous way.
Now that’s just the sort of game of ethical Twister that Hitherby is all about.
Joejay on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
i’d say it would if you had a sufficently virtuous motivation for dropping the flowerpot to begin with. a bumbling fool may try and fail to be virtuous: but so may a learned scholar fail to find the true path of virtue and be waylaid by a number of myriad events. It isn’t easy to do the right thing, and it isn’t easy to know what that right thing is. Not looking before dropping the flowerpot out the window is not a virtuous action – so I agree with you on the example, but not the reasoning.
It is, however, difficult to have a motivation for dropping flowerpots out of windows so virtuous that it overcomes the anti-virtue inherent in killing babies. I think it would have to have been intended to save a life, and with a chain of logic behind it sufficiently valid as to be considered entirely reasonable; I cannot offhand think of any circumstances which would fit that bill.
GoldenH on November 30, -0001 at 12:00 am said:
no, neither can I. This is why I do not throw things off 10 story windows.